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this may end up with a gridlock of the interbank market at that date. An-
ticipating such possible contingency, banks currently long of liquidity ask a
liquidity premium for lending beyond a short maturity, as a compensation
for the risk of being short of liquidity later and being forced to liquidate some
illiquid assets. Then banks currently short of liquidity may prefer to borrow
short term. The model is able to explain some stylized facts of the 2007-
2009 liquidity crunch aﬀecting the money market at the international level:
(i) high spreads between interest rates at diﬀerent maturities; (ii) "ﬂight to
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The liquidity crunch taking place in the interbank market during the 2007-
2009 international ﬁnancial turmoil raises some puzzling questions:
- why did the spread between the medium term and the short term (say
three month − overnight) interest rates jump to unprecedented levels?
- why did the trading activity dry up in those market segments with
maturities longer than very short term (so called "ﬂight to overnight")?
- why did these phenomenons occur and persist for a long time despite
the massive injections of liquidity by the central banks of several countries
(often coordinated through swap agreements)?
There is a wide empirical evidence documenting the stylized facts sum-
marized in the above three questions − and some additional evidence for
the euro area is provided in the Appendix. See Cecchetti (2009), Taylor
- Williams (2008), and Ashcraft - McAndrews - Skeie (2008) for the U.S.;
Heider - Hoerova - Holthausen (2009), Eisenschmidt - Tapking (2009), and
ECB (2009, a) for the euro area.
The present work tries to give a theoretical contribution in explaining
this puzzle. The starting point is that we have to ﬁnd an explanation by
looking at the interplay between credit and liquidity risks. Those models
focussing on a single source of risk are not able to provide a satisfactory
answer1. If liquidity were the only relevant variable, central banks should
have been able to rapidly restore normal conditions in the interbank mar-
ket, by injecting huge amounts of liquidity and making the supply of bank
reserves meet the level demanded by the banking system. If credit risk were
the only relevant variable, it would be hard to explain the remarkable dif-
ferences across market segments, in particular why the short term segment
has been rather immune from the crunch: why should a bank be ready to
lend short term at normal rates to another bank, if she believes that the
counterparty might not be able to repay?
In our approach, banks face two risks at the same time.
Liquidity risk: a bank hit by a liquidity shock is uncertain whether such
a shock is going to be "permanent" (lasting for two periods) or "transitory"
(lasting for one period only). As a consequence, if a bank with an excess
liquidity lends it long term, she undertakes the risk of being short of liquidity
in the future: if the initial positive shock turns out later to be transitory
1Models applying the Diamond - Dybvig (1983) approach generally focus on liquidity
risk (see the references in the next section). Alternatively, Flannery (1996) focusses on
credit risk under asymmetric information, showing how adverse selection may lead to a
break down of the interbank market.
2− making the excess liquidity vanish − s u c hab a n kw i l lh a v et ob o r r o w
in the interbank market to fund the long term loan. The liquidity risk
has become more relevant during the ﬁnancial turmoil, due to a higher
volatility of liquidity shocks. A factor contributing to this volatility is the
complexity of ﬁnancial conglomerates together with the sudden freezing of
some segments of the money market: for example, a vehicle unable to roll-
over an outstanding issue of asset-backed commercial paper may draw on the
bank credit line supporting such an issue. An indicator of liquidity (funding)
risk is the behavior of banks participating in monetary policy operations:
the evidence reported in the Appendix shows a more aggressive behavior in
open market operations, pointing to an increased funding risk during the
ﬁnancial crisis.
Credit risk: the interbank market may be hit by a negative shock in
the future, implying that some participants suﬀer losses so large to become
insolvent. The distribution of those losses is private information, implying
an adverse selection problem. The globalization of ﬁnancial markets plays
a key role under this regard: a bad news aﬀecting a large player can have
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on market participants in other countries, due to the
network of exposures at the international level. More broadly, this assump-
tion captures the idea that − during a ﬁnancial crisis − market participants
fear a sudden worsening of the adverse selection typically aﬀecting a credit
market with asymmetric information.
The interplay between these two sources of risk does not have any strik-
ing implications as long as the adverse selection problem is not too severe.
In this case, the only consequence is that a credit risk premium must be
incorporated into the interbank interest rates. The liquidity risk does not
have any dramatic consequence, since banks are conﬁdent that they will be
able to raise liquidity in the future if they need to do so (in order either to
fund a long term interbank loan or to roll-over a short term interbank debt).
Things get much worse if the possible adverse selection problem is so
severe to make the interbank market dry up. This gridlock is not surprising
per se: the drop of trades in a market aﬀected by an adverse selection prob-
lem is a standard result in agency theory. However it bears some interesting
implications for the equilibrium of the interbank market before such break-
down may possibly occur. Banks now take into account the chance that the
interbank market may no longer be there in the near future, forcing those
banks short of liquidity at that time to liquidate illiquid assets and suﬀer
signiﬁcant liquidation costs. Hence banks currently long of liquidity ask a
liquidity premium on a long term interbank loan, as a compensation for the
expected liquidation cost. Two alternative situations may then arise. (i)
3Banks currently short of liquidity are ready to pay such liquidity premium,
in order to avoid the roll-over risk incurred by borrowing short term. (ii)
If the (lowest possible) liquidity premium required by lending banks is too
high, banks currently short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term. The
latter alternative prevails if liquidity shocks are more likely to be transitory
than permanent.
The model is able to provide some tentative answers to the questions
raised at the beginning of this Introduction. First, the chance of a gridlock
of the interbank market in the future adds a relevant component to the
spread between medium and short term interbank rates, by introducing
a liquidity premium. Second, if the volatility of liquidity shocks is high
enough − which was presumably the case during the ﬁnancial turmoil −
the liquidity premium on longer maturities gets so large that banks needing
to raise liquidity prefer to borrow on shorter maturities: this provides an
explanation for the "ﬂight to overnight". Finally, the key ingredients leading
to the above results are the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and
credit risk, while no aggregate shortage of liquidity ever comes into the
picture: by deﬁnition, the management of the aggregate liquidity supply by
the central bank does not play an explicit role in this context.
The plan of the paper is the following. After a brief review of the related
literature (Section 2), the model is illustrated in Section 3. Some policy
implications are derived in Section 4, and the main insights of the analysis
are summarized in Section 5. Finally, the Appendix documents some stylized
facts supporting the predictions of the model.
2 Related literature
The theory of banking has for a long time built on the seminal contribution
by Diamond - Dybvig 1983 (DD). The key insight of the DD framework is
that banks insure consumers against liquidity risk. Since they invest only a
fraction of deposits in liquid reserves, banks bear the risk of being short of
liquidity in some contingencies, including a coordination failure among retail
depositors ("bank run"). This approach has generated a wide literature
(surveyed in Allen - Gale 2007), and it has been applied to the analysis of
the interbank market; see for example Bhattacharya - Gale (1987), Allen -
Gale (2000), and Freixas - Martin - Skeie (2009).
However, there is quite a strong evidence that the global liquidity crunch,
starting in August 2007, was not triggered by retail depositors, even in
those cases where they might appear to be responsible for that (e.g. North-
4ern Rock). To the contrary, the hoarding behavior of ﬁnancial institutions
played a crucial role, making liquidity dry up in the money market. Banks
more relying on wholesale (international) markets for their funding were the
more prone to a liquidity squeeze, contrary to those more relying on retail
deposits2. See Shin (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), and Ashcraft - McAndrews
- Skeie (2008).
Therefore several recent studies abstract from retail deposits and fo-
cus on wholesale money markets. Huang - Ratnovski (2008) extend the
Calomiris - Kahn (1991) framework to show that short term wholesale ﬁ-
nanciers can force an ineﬃcient liquidation of bank assets. The same issue
was tackled even before the recent crisis by Rochet - Vives (2004), pointing
to the coordination failure among large CD holders. Acharya - Gale - Yorul-
mazer (2009) show that the release of information may cause the market
for asset-backed securities to dry up. Adrian - Shin (2009) and Brunner-
meier - Pedersen (2008) study the mechanisms amplifying the impact of a
(small) shock to the balance sheet of ﬁnancial intermediaries ("loss spirals"
and "margin spirals"). This growing body of literature generally studies the
market for short term bank liabilities − including repos and commercial pa-
per − held by non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, like mutual and hedge funds.
My paper shares with this literature the attention paid to the incentives
and constraints faced by players in the money market, abstracting from the
behavior of retail depositors. However my focus is on the role of the un-
secured interbank market, where banks trade their reserves in response to
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
A couple of papers are very close to mine, as they deal with the inter-
action between liquidity and credit risk in the interbank market. Let me
expand on them.
The key element in Eisenschmidt - Tapking (2009) is the risk, faced by
a lender in the interbank market, that his creditworthiness may eventually
worsen, making his cost of funding rise. This risk explains the liquidity pre-
mium charged on interbank loans and it possibly makes the traded volumes
in the long term market drop to zero. Diﬀerently from mine, their model
crucially rests on the existence of a secured interbank market, providing an
alternative source of funding. Moreover, they do not introduce any infor-
mational issue possibly leading to a gridlock of the interbank market. They
assume instead that in the short term unsecured market − a n di nt h es e -
cured market on all maturities as well − trades always take place at an
2The huge amount of wholesale short term funding in foreign currency has been at the
origin of the Icelandic banking crisis. See Buiter - Sibert (2008).
5exogenous interest rate.
The model by Heider - Hoerova - Holthausen (2009) is still within the
DD framework. Banks are uncertain about the number of their "impatient"
depositors and about the riskiness of their illiquid assets. The interbank
market may break down because of adverse selection: in such a case, banks
short of liquidity need to liquidate part of their illiquid assets. The main
diﬀerence with my approach (apart from methodological issues) is that they
do not consider an interbank market with diﬀerent maturities; then by de-
ﬁnition their model is unable to explain the emergence of high spreads be-
tween interest rates at diﬀerent maturities as well as the so-called "ﬂight to
overnight". In addition, their analysis is limited to the break-down taking
place in the interbank market at the time where an adverse selection prob-
lem emerges; to the contrary, my model stresses the impact of a gridlock
before it can actually occur.
Finally, there is a growing empirical literature related to this paper,
trying to measure the two risk premia − credit and liquidity − incorporated
in money market spreads since August 2007. It is diﬃcult to say which of
the two items prevails: while some authors provide evidence that credit risk
is predominant (an example is Taylor - Williams 2008), others stress the
importance of liquidity risk (an example is Eisenschmidt - Tapking 2009).
The role of liquidity is documented also by those studies focussing on the
intraday patterns of traded volumes and of interest rates in the interbank
market (see Hansal - Jackson - Merrouche 2008, and Baglioni - Monticini
2008 a,b). Overall, the evidence shows that both elements play a relevant
role, supporting the view - taken here - that we should look at the interplay
between the two sources of risk.
3 The model
3.1 Set-up
Let us consider a banking system where each bank is endowed with 1 unit of
retail deposits invested in loans3. All agents in the economy are risk-neutral.
3The assumption that all banks enter the model without any liquid reserves needs
to be justiﬁed. The rationale behind this assumption is that, for any target level of
liquid reserves, a bank may be hit either by a positive shock, creating excess (undesired)
reserves, or by a negative shock exceeding available reserves. Then a bank, with a positive
target level of liquid reserves, may turn out to be either long or short of liquidity, due
to random shocks. We are not interested here in determining ex ante the optimal target
level of reserves, but rather in how an ex post shortage or excess of liquidity is managed
6There are three dates: t =0 ,1,2. Retail deposits are repaid at t =2 ,a n d
they are fully insured through a fairly priced deposit insurance scheme4.
Thus banks pay the riskless rate of interest on deposits. These assumptions
capture the fact that retail deposits are a stable source of funding, due to
the passive behavior of depositors, even during a ﬁnancial turmoil like the
one taking place in 2007-2008 (see the discussion in the previous section).
Of course, this passive behavior rests on the safety net supporting the bank-
ing system, which is introduced here in a stylized way through the deposit
insurance. Needless to say, the insurance does not cover the interbank loans.
The focus of this paper is not on aggregate liquidity, which can be man-
aged by the central bank through the usual tools (open market operations).
Therefore I assume that there never is any liquidity shortage for the banking
system as a whole. As a consequence, there is competition among lenders in
the interbank market, where lenders’ reservation price is the riskless rate of
interest: they demand an expected return on an interbank loan weakly larger
than the riskless rate. This rate is set by the monetary policy authority, and
its level is assumed to be zero for simplicity.
The focus is on the idiosyncratic liquidity risk faced by individual banks,
and on the interplay between this source of risk and the other fundamental
banking risk, namely credit risk. I model each of them in turn below.
3.1.1 Liquidity risk and the interbank market
At t =0 , some banks are hit by a positive liquidity shock: they have a
deposit inﬂow equal to x, so their retail deposits jump to 1+x (where
0 <x<1). Other banks are hit by an opposite shock −x: their deposits
decline to 1 − x. Each of these liquidity shocks is either "permanent" or
"transitory". A permanent shock lasts until t =2 . A transitory shock lasts
only until t =1 : at this date the deposit level comes back to 1. A bank
observes the nature of the shock at t =1 ,w h i l ea tt =0she knows that it
is permanent with probability p. This framework is designed to formalize in
a simple way the random nature of liquidity shocks: a shock today might
be wiped out tomorrow by another one of the opposite sign. Moreover,
liquidity shocks are assumed to be publicly observable; thus our results do
not depend on any opportunistic behavior due to asymmetric information
by a bank. Therefore it seems reasonable to set the initial level of liquid reserves at an
exogenous value (zero for simplicity), and to study banks’ reactions to any deviations of
available reserves from such a level.
4Fair pricing of the deposit insurance is a technical assumption, introduced in order to
avoid any incentive distortion (risk-taking attitude) arising from ﬂat insurance premia.
7about individual liquidity imbalances5. Table 1 shows the impact of liquidity
shocks on the deposits available to individual banks.
Table 1 - Liquidity shocks and bank deposits
t =0 t =1
shock permanent transitory
1+x 1+x 1
1 − x 1 − x 1
In both periods t =0 ,1 banks long of liquidity can lend in the interbank
market. In particular, in t =0both a short term (ST) and a long term (LT)
interbank markets exist: a ST loan matures at t =1and a LT loan matures
at t =2 .I nt =1only a ST market is available by deﬁnition, as all loans
have to be repaid by t =2 . As an alternative, banks can store liquidity in a
riskless asset (e.g. Treasury Bills or reserves held at the central bank): this
is safe and perfectly liquid, but its return is zero.
Banks short of liquidity can either borrow in the interbank market or
liquidate loans. The latter alternative is costly, since loans are illiquid in
nature (see the next subsection).6
3.1.2 Credit risk
The are two states of nature, high and low: s ∈ {h,l}.I f s = h all banks
are "good" (G): their loan portfolio is worth VG ≥ 1+x,p r o v i d e di ti sn o t
liquidated until t =2 . To the contrary, if s = l as h a r eα of the banking
system is made up of "bad" (B) banks: these have a loan portfolio which is
worth VB ≤ 1−x in t =2 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,VG is assumed to be large enough
that a good bank is always solvent at t =2(i.e. able to repay all her retail
deposits plus interbank liabilities). To the contrary, VB is assumed to be
low enough that a bad bank is always insolvent at t =2 . Moreover, retail
depositors (or equivalently the depos i ti n s u r e r )h a v eas e n i o rc l a i m ,s oa n
5The alternative assumption that liquidity shocks are private information would
strengthen the results below, since it would make a gridlock in the interbank market
even more likely (see footnote 11).
6A further alternative that could be considered is borrowing from the central bank.
However this generally occurs at a penalizing interest rate, and this penalty would play
in my framework much the same role as the liquidation cost introduced below. Therefore
I do not consider it explicitly here. The role of the discount window policy is discussed in
Section 4.
8Figure 1: Loan portfolio value
interbank debt maturing at t =2is never repaid by a bad bank7.F i g u r e1
shows the structure of the credit risk introduced here.
This framework formalizes the idea that with some probability (say k)
a negative shock hits the market at t =1 , implying that some participants
suﬀer losses large enough to become "lemons". An example is the bank-
ruptcy of a large ﬁnancial intermediary, having obligations with many other
institutions in several countries: the distribution among market participants
of the losses implied by this shock is diﬃcult to asses in a short time. During
the global ﬁnancial crisis starting in August 2007, the concerns that some
bad news of such a kind could be released grew substantially, relative to
normal times (and some very bad news did eventually hit the market, like
the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy). The evidence reported in the Appen-
dix documents that the probability of bank failures has shown a dramatic
increase during the crisis.
In t =1everyone observes which state occurs, but each bank observes
only her own type: the ﬁnal value of the loan portfolio is a private infor-
mation at this date. Of course, this private information problem is relevant
7This seniority assumption is introduced for simplicity: the recovery rate on an inter-
bank loan to a bad bank is zero. Allowing for a positive recovery rate would not alter the
results below.
9only in the low state; in this case an interbank claim maturing at t =2will
be repaid with probability (1 − α),8 as far as the lender knows.
As of t =0all banks are identical: each of them is aware that there
c a nb eas h o c ki nt h eﬁnancial system at t =1 , making some banks −
possibly including herself − to be lemons. Each bank’s loan portfolio is
worth V0 = πVG +( 1− π)VB,w h e r eπ =( 1− k)+k(1 − α) and V0 > 1
by assumption. A LT interbank claim will be repaid with probability π.T o
the contrary, a ST loan is riskless, since all banks are assumed to be always
able to repay their interbank liabilities at t =1 , either by rolling over a ST
debt or by liquidating part of their loan portfolio (formally: LB ≥ x)9.
In case of early liquidation in t =1 , a bank’s loan portfolio is worth LG or
LB, depending on her type. If liquidated at t =0 , loans are worth L0 for all
banks. For simplicity, the ratio between the continuation and the liquidation
value is assumed to be the same in all cases: l = VG
LG = VB
LB = V0
L0 > 1.10
3.2 The liquidity management problem
The crucial decision a bank has to take at t =0is whether to trade in
the interbank market and, if so, whether to trade ST or LT. Each of these
acts has a quite diﬀerent impact on the liquidity position of the bank in the
next period, depending on whether a liquidity shock turns out to be either
permanent or transitory. We have to analyze in some detail this issue before
solving the model.
Consider ﬁrst a bank hit by a positive liquidity shock: she is long of
liquidity at t =0 . Suppose she lends ST (or stores) at this date:
-i ft h es h o c ki spermanent,a tt =1she is still long of liquidity: she can
lend again (or store);
-i ft h es h o c ki stransitory, her liquidity position is balanced at t =1 :t h e
deposit outﬂow (from 1+x to 1) is funded by the incoming repayment of
the interbank loan (or by drawing on the liquid reserves previously stored).
Now suppose that she lends LT at t =0 :
-i ft h es h o c ki spermanent, her position is balanced at t =1 : there is no
inﬂow/outﬂow of liquidity at this date;
8To be precise, this is the average repayment probability in the pooling equilibrium
described below. As we shall see, an alternative scenario is one with no trade at t =1 .
9Note that the above assumption, that retail deposits are a senior claim, is actually
enforced only at t =2 . Due to the passive behavior of retail depositors, interbank loans
are de facto − although not formally − senior at t =1 .
10It must be stressed that this is only a simplifying assumption, not necessary to get
the results below. To the contrary, Heider - Hoerova - Holthausen (2009) need to assume
that the opportunity cost of liquidation is higher for a riskier bank.
10-i ft h es h o c ki stransitory, she is going to be short of liquidity at t =1 :
s h ew i l lh a v et of u n dt h ed e p o s i to u t ﬂow (from 1+x to 1) either by borrowing
in the interbank market or by liquidating part of her loan portfolio.
The same reasoning applies to a bank hit by a negative liquidity shock:
she is short of liquidity at t =0 . Suppose she borrows ST at this date:
-i ft h es h o c ki spermanent, she is still short of liquidity at t =1 :s h e
has to borrow again or to liquidate some loans;
-i ft h es h o c ki stransitory, her liquidity position is balanced at t =1 :
she repays her interbank debt by the deposit inﬂow (from 1 − x to 1).
Suppose instead that she borrows LT (or liquidates) at t =0 :
-i ft h es h o c ki spermanent, her position is balanced at t =1 : there is no
inﬂow/outﬂow of liquidity at this date;
-i ft h es h o c ki stransitory, she is going to be long of liquidity at t =1 :
she will lend out (or store) the deposit inﬂow (from 1 − x to 1).
Table 2 summarizes the above discussion. It can be noted that if a bank
trades ST at t =0and the liquidity shock is transitory, or alternatively if she
trades LT and the shock is permanent, her liquidity position is balanced at
t =1 : she does not need to take any action at this date. To the contrary, if a
bank trades ST at t =0and the shock is permanent, she ﬁnds herself at t =1
in the same situation as she was in the previous period; in particular, she
has to roll over her debt in presence of a negative shock. More interestingly,
if a bank trades LT at t =0and the shock turns out to be transitory, her
liquidity position is reversed at t =1and she has to trade in a way opposite
to what she did before. In particular, a bank hit by a positive liquidity
shock and lending LT undertakes the risk of being short of liquidity in the
next period; this risk is going to play a crucial role below in determining the
liquidity premium.
Table 2 - The liquidity management problem
t =0 t =1
SHOCK PERMANENT TRANSITORY
1+x lend ST (store) long: lend (store) balanced: do nothing
long lend LT balanced: do nothing short: borrow (liquidate)
1 − x borrow ST short: borrow (liquidate) balanced: do nothing
short b o r r o wL T( l i q u i d a t e ) balanced: do nothing long: lend (store)
In the following, we are going to solve the model backward. First, we
determine the alternative equilibria prevailing in the interbank market at
t =1 , depending on the state of nature governing the evolution of credit risk
(s ∈ [h,l]) and on parameter values. Second, we determine the alternative
11equilibria at t =0 , which of course depend on the possible outcomes obtained
at t =1 .
3.3 The interbank market at t =1
We want to determine whether at t =1there are trades in the interbank
market and, if so, at which rate of interest. If there is a positive volume
of trades, the interbank market is said to be "active". The alternative
situation, where no trade takes place, is labelled "gridlock". We know that
at t =1only ST trades are possible by deﬁnition. We also know that
there are some banks long of liquidity: they can either lend in the interbank
market or store. Other banks are short of liquidity: they can either borrow
or liquidate. These outside options allow us to identify their reservation
prices for trading in the interbank market: the lowest interest rate asked by
a lending bank and the highest rate that a borrowing bank is ready to pay.
An interbank loan at t =1is deﬁned as a trade where a bank transfers at
this date an amount x to another bank, and the latter promises to repay R
at t =2 .Il a b e lR the lending bank’s reservation price and R the borrower’s
reservation price. The feasibility condition for an interbank loan at t =1is:
R ≤ R.
Let us begin by examining the simple case where the good state occurs:
s = h.
Proposition 1 Let s = h at t =1 . The interbank market is active and the
equilibrium price is Rh = x.
Proof. Interbank loans are riskless, so lenders’ reservation price is Rh = x.
As an alternative to borrowing, a short bank has to liquidate a share x
LG of
her loan portfolio, giving up a return x
LGVG = xl,w i t hl>1;s oRh = xl.
Hence Rh >R h: the feasibility condition is met. Due to competition among
lenders, the equilibrium price is Rh = x. At this price all banks short of
liquidity borrow, since liquidating is more costly.
So in the good state trades take place at the riskless rate of interest, since
all banks are able to repay for sure at t =2 . All banks short of liquidity are
able to borrow in the interbank market.
The issue becomes more interesting in the low state: s = l.
Proposition 2 Let s = l at t =1 .
(A) If l ≥ 1
(1−α), the interbank market is active and the pooling equilib-
rium price is Rl = x
(1−α).
12(B) If l< 1
(1−α), there is a gridlock in the interbank market.
Proof. (A) In a pooling equilibrium a lender in the interbank market is
repaid with probability (1−α), so lenders’ reservation price is given by (1−
α)Rl = x. A good bank borrowing in the interbank market has a reservation
price Rl = xl.H e n c e Rl ≥ Rl: the feasibility condition is met. A bad
bank never repays an interbank debt, so the expected cost of borrowing in the
interbank market is zero, while liquidating would cost x
LBVB = xl.H e n c e
she is ready to (promise to) pay any price for borrowing and the feasibility
condition is trivially met. Due to competition among lenders, the equilibrium
price is Rl = x
(1−α). At this price all banks short of liquidity borrow, since
liquidating is more costly.
(B) A good bank short of liquidity has a reservation price xl < x
(1−α).
Hence the pooling price − obtained in (A) − is not an equilibrium price,
since the feasibility condition fails to hold for good banks. Banks long of
liquidity are aware that only bad banks are ready to borrow (at any price) in
the interbank market, so they do not lend.
Proposition 2 shows that the emergence of a lemon problem in the inter-
bank market ends up with two quite diﬀerent outcomes, depending on the
size of the liquidation cost relative to the share of "lemons" present in the
banking system. For any value of α, if the liquidation cost is high enough,
good banks short of liquidity prefer to borrow and the pooling equilibrium
is feasible. In this case, the only consequence is a rise of the price charged
on interbank loans, which has to incorporate a premium for the credit risk
incurred by the lender. The (standard) implication is that − on the bor-
rowing side − good banks subsidize bad ones11. If the liquidation cost is
instead low enough, good banks are no longer ready to pay the bill and they
prefer to liquidate. In this case, the pooling equilibrium breaks down and
no bank is able to raise funds in the interbank market. As a consequence,
all banks short of liquidity suﬀer a liquidation cost.
The crucial insight given by Proposition 2 is that, if the value of α during
a ﬁnancial crisis diﬀers considerably from "normal times", this may have
relevant consequences for the market equilibrium. A lemon problem might
11The assumption that liquidity shocks are public information rules out opportunistic
behavior by bad banks, which are not short of liquidity, when the pooling equilibrium pre-
vails. If these banks try to make a proﬁt by borrowing and storing liquidity (exploiting the
information that they will not repay the interbank debt), the other market participants
are able to detect such banks and they do not lend to them. Allowing for such an oppor-
tunistic behavior − by assuming that liquidity shocks were privately observed − would
increase the number of bad banks borrowing in the interbank market. As a consequence,
lenders’ reservation price would increase, making a gridlock even more likely to occur.
13emerge also in normal times, but during a crisis period market participants
fear that its impact is going to be stronger, for several reasons. For example,
because they believe that a large intermediary may possibly fail, causing
losses to many other institutions, while normally this is ruled out by the
"bail out" policy of supervisory authorities. In 2008 there have been a
growing concern that the authorities were not sticking to the "too-big-too-
fail" doctrine, and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy conﬁrmed that such
concern was well grounded. So the distinctive feature of a crisis period is
the possibility of a large shock hitting the market, with a negative impact on
so many participants to lead to a gridlock (formally, a crisis period features
a higher value of α relative to normal times).
3.4 The interbank market at t =0
At t =0both a ST and a LT interbank markets exist. We want to identify
the conditions under which these markets are active and, in such a case, the
equilibrium prices.
A ST interbank loan at t =0is deﬁned as a trade where a bank transfers
at this date an amount x to another bank, and the latter promises to repay
R1 at t =1 . Similarly, a LT interbank loan at t =0is deﬁned as a trade
where a bank transfers at this date an amount x to another bank, and the
latter promises to repay R2 at t =2 . As we know, the outside option to
trading in the interbank market is to store liquidity for a long bank, and
to liquidate a share of her loan portfolio for a short bank. These outside
options determine their reservation prices: R1,R 2 and R1,R2 for a long and
for a short bank respectively. The feasibility condition must now be met in
both the ST and the LT markets: R1 ≤ R1 and R2 ≤ R2 respectively.
Moreover, for both markets to be active all banks must be indiﬀerent
between trading in the ST and in the LT markets. The comparison between
the payoﬀs obtained by trading ST and LT has to take into account not only
the equilibrium prices, but also the implications that trading at t =0bears
on the liquidity position of a bank in the next period, and on her need to
trade again at t =1(as illustrated in Table 2).
The equilibrium at t =0crucially depends on the outcome obtained at
t =1 . As we have seen in the previous section, a gridlock in the interbank
market can occur at t =1when the following condition fails to hold:
l ≥
1
(1 − α)
(1)
Therefore I consider two separate cases: (A) condition (1) holds; (B) condi-
14tion (1) does not hold.
3.4.1 Case (A): no gridlock at t =1
Proposition 3 Let l ≥ 1
(1−α). Both the ST and the LT interbank mar-
k e t sa r ea c t i v ea tt =0 . The equilibrium prices are R1 = x and R2 = x
π
respectively.
Proof. ST market. ST interbank loans are riskless, so lenders’ reservation
price is R1 = x. As an alternative to borrowing, a short bank has to liquidate
a share x
L0 of her loan portfolio, giving up a return x
L0V0 = xl,w i t hl>1;
so R1 = xl.H e n c e R1 >R 1: the feasibility condition is met. Due to
competition among lenders, the equilibrium price is R1 = x.
LT market. LT interbank loans are repaid with probability π,s ol e n d e r s ’
reservation price is given by πR2 = x and borrowers’ reservation price is
given by πR2 = xl.H e n c eR2 >R 2: the feasibility condition is met. Due
to competition among lenders, the equilibrium price is R2 = x
π.
At the equilibrium prices R1 and R2, banks short of liquidity borrow,
since liquidating is more costly.
All banks are indiﬀerent between trading ST and LT, since the expectation
− as of t =0− of their ﬁnal value is as follows12. The expected value of a
long bank lending ST is13:
p[V0 +( 1− k)Rh + k(1 − α)Rl − (1 + x)] + (1 − p)(V0 − 1) = V0 − 1 (2)
The expected value of a long bank lending LT is14:
p[V0 + πR2 − (1 + x)]+(1−p){V0 + πR2 − [(1 − k)Rh + k(1 − α)Rl] − 1} = V0−1
(3)
12The expectations below are computed by taking the diﬀerence between the values of
assets and liabilities, including the positions to be taken at t =1in the interbank market,
if any. Contrary to interbank debt, retail deposits appear in the expressions below with
a repayment probability equal to one: this is due to the assumed fair pricing of the
deposit insurance scheme, through which any expected liability of the deposit insurer is
internalized to the bank issuing deposits.
13This value is calculated by assuming that the bank rolls over the loan at t =1 , if the
liquidity shock is permanent. The same result is obtained if the bank stores the excess
liquidity at t =1(this could happen because of the aggregate excess liquidity assumed in
our set-up).
14Note that if the liquidity shock is transitory the bank has to borrow at t =1 .T h e
probability of repaying this debt in the low state (s = l)i s(1 − α), with the information
available at t =0 .
15T h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fas h o r tb a n kb o r r o w i n gS Ti s :
p{V0 − [(1 − k)Rh + k(1 − α)Rl] − (1 − x)}+(1−p)(V0 −1) = V0 −1 (4)
T h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fas h o r tb a n kb o r r o w i n gL Ti s :
p[V0 − πR2 − (1 − x)]+(1−p){V0 − πR2 +[ ( 1− k)Rh + k(1 − α)Rl] − 1} = V0−1
(5)
Proposition 3 shows that, given that the interbank market is active at
t =1 , the spread between the LT and the ST interbank rates at t =0
incorporates only a credit risk premium, due to the possibility that a LT
loan will not be repaid, whereas a ST loan is risk-free. Thus the spread is:
R2 − R1 = x(
1
π
− 1) (6)
The liquidity risk, namely the risk of being short of liquidity in the next
period, plays no role in this context, since a bank is always able to raise
funds in the interbank market at an interest rate reﬂecting her credit risk,
thus paying an expected rate of interest equal to zero. Under this regard,
t h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h eS Ti n t e r e s tr a t ej u m p sf r o mt h er i s k l e s sl e v e lt oa
positive one, due to an increase of credit risk, bears no consequence. Both
the ST and the LT markets are active, since the expected value of a bank −
as of t =0− does not depend on the maturity of her interbank trade, so she
is indiﬀerent between trading ST and LT.15 This expected value is V0 − 1
regardless of the sign of the liquidity shock, thanks to the redistribution of
liquidity taking place through the interbank market. Things are going to
change in case (B).
3.4.2 Case (B): possible gridlock at t =1
Proposition 4 Let l< 1
(1−α).I f p<(>)1
2, only the ST (LT) interbank
market is active at t =0 .I f p = 1
2, both the ST and the LT markets are
active. The equilibrium prices are R1 = x and R2 = x
π [1 + (1 − p)k(l − 1)]
respectively.
Proof. ST market. The same as in Case (A).
LT market. LT interbank loans are repaid with probability π.L e n d e r s ’
reservation price is given by πR2−x(1−p)k(l−1) = x: the expected cost of
15This result contrasts the one obtained in Eisenschmidt - Tapking (2009), where a
possible future rise of interest rates − reﬂecting a positive default probability − is enough
to make the long term interbank market break down.
16funding a LT loan by liquidating at t =1must be subtracted from the expected
return on such a loan. Borrowers’ reservation price is given by πR2 = xl.I t
is easy to check that R2 >R 2: the feasibility condition is met. Due to com-
petition among lenders, the equilibrium price is R2 = x
π [1 + (1 − p)k(l − 1)].
Banks long of liquidity are indiﬀerent between lending ST and LT, since
the expectation − as of t =0− of their ﬁnal value is as follows. The expected
value if lending ST is16:
p[V0 + x − (1 + x)] + (1 − p)(V0 − 1) = V0 − 1 (7)
The expected value if lending LT is17:
p[V0 + πR2 − (1 + x)]+(1−p){V0 + πR2 − [(1 − k)Rh + kxl] − 1} = V0−1
(8)
At the equilibrium prices R1 and R2, banks short of liquidity borrow,
since liquidating is more costly. They prefer to borrow either ST if p<1
2,
or LT if p>1
2 (they are indiﬀerent if p = 1
2), since the expectation − as of
t =0− of their ﬁnal value is as follows. The expected value if borrowing
ST is:
p{V0 − [(1 − k)Rh + kxl] − (1 − x)}+(1−p)(V0−1) = V0−1−pkx(l−1) (9)
The expected value if borrowing LT is:
p[V0 − πR2 − (1 − x)]+(1−p)[V0 − πR2 + x − 1] = V0−1−(1−p)kx(l−1)
(10)
Proposition 4 highlights the main points of this paper. First, the spread
between the LT and the ST interbank rates at t =0incorporates not only
a credit risk premium, but also a liquidity risk premium. Thus the spread
is now:
R2 − R1 = x
·
(
1
π
− 1) +
(1 − p)k(l − 1)
π
¸
(11)
The second term in brackets is the compensation asked by a bank lending
LT for the risk she incurs of being short of liquidity in the next period and
16If the liquidity shock is permanent, the bank either lends x at t =1(in state s = h)
or stores (in state s = l). In both cases the value of this excess liquidity is x.
17Note that if the liquidity shock is transitory and the state is s = l, the bank has to
liquidate at t =1 ,g i v i n gu pxl.
17being forced to liquidate part of her loan portfolio: this happens if the initial
positive liquidity shock is eventually reversed and there is a gridlock in the
interbank market at t =1 . Note that the liquidity premium is due to the
interplay between the credit risk and the liquidity risk: both elements are
necessary to generate a positive liquidity premium (it is immediate to see
that the liquidity premium vanishes if either k =0or p =1 ). The model
is then able to explain the dramatic increase of the spread between medium
term and short term interest rates (say three month − overnight) taking
place during the liquidity crunch of 2007-2008: the risk of a gridlock of the
interbank market in the near future seems to play a relevant role, since it
introduces an additional component into such a spread.
Second, banks initially short of liquidity are not indiﬀerent (in general)
between borrowing ST and LT. They have to compare the liquidity premium
charged on a LT loan with the liquidity risk they incur by borrowing ST:
a ST debt should be rolled-over in the next period if the liquidity shock is
permanent, but this is not possible if the interbank market is gridlocked at
t =1 , implying a liquidation cost. The balance between these two costs
depends on p. If the liquidity shock is more likely to be permanent (p>1
2),
the liquidity premium charged on a LT loan is more than outweighed by the
r i s ko fb e i n gf o r c e dt ol i q u i d a t ea tt =1 : than all banks short of liquidity
at t =0prefer to pay the price of borrowing LT. The opposite happens
if the liquidity shock is more likely to be transitory (p<1
2): in this case
the liquidity premium on a LT loan is too high and all short banks prefer
to borrow ST18. Therefore trades drop to zero either in the ST or in the
LT interbank market. The latter case seems to be more relevant in the
interpretation of the liquidity crunch: the available evidence points to a
"ﬂight to overnight" in the trading activity. The model is able to explain
this polarization of trades: this is presumably due to a high volatility of the
liquidity shocks during the ﬁnancial turmoil, inducing the lending banks to
ask a high liquidity premium and the borrowing banks to react by trading
on very short maturities (some evidence supporting this view is provided in
the Appendix).
Again, it must be stressed that such a polarization of trades occurs
only in presence of a risk of gridlock of the interbank market in the near
future (case B in our model). To the contrary, the risk of an increase of the
interbank interest rate, due to a possible future shock to credit risk (case A),
18Note that this happens despite the fact that the equilibrium liquidity premium is the
minimum needed for a lending bank to break-even (i.e. to get an expected return equal
to zero), thanks to the assumption of competition among lenders.
18is not able to produce the same outcome. It is also worth noting that multiple
equilibria and coordination failures are not at work here: given the values of
model parameters, a unique equilibrium is determined. As mentioned before,
the equilibrium described in case A seems to be appropriate in normal times,
while case B becomes relevant under a crisis scenario.
Finally, note that an ineﬃcient liquidation of illiquid loans is unavoidable
in the low state (case B), and the expected cost of this ineﬃciency is paid
by those banks initially hit by a negative liquidity shock. They pay directly
the liquidation cost if they borrow ST at t =0a n dt h e ya r ee v e n t u a l l y
forced to liquidate at t =1 . Alternatively, banks lending LT may be forced
to liquidate at t =1 , but they are able to translate the expected liquidation
cost to the borrowing banks at t =0 .
4 Policy implications
A key element of the model is the adverse selection issue raised by the lack of
information about the quality of bank assets. The ﬁrst policy implication is
that the intervention of the authorities should be devoted to improving the
transparency of ﬁnancial institutions and markets. The complexity of large
(international) ﬁnancial groups have worsened the quality of the information
released through their balance sheets. The opacity of the OTC markets has
prevented market participants from having a clear picture of the distribution
of losses arising from the crisis of speciﬁc market segments (like ABS). A
regulatory and supervisory intervention in this area is needed19.
To the contrary, the management of aggregate liquidity − through cen-
tral bank open market operations − does not seem to be the right answer
to the issues raised here, since none of the above results derives from an ag-
gregate shortage of liquidity. Of course, aggregate liquidity shocks do take
place in the real world, calling for central bank intervention. However, in-
creasing the supply of bank reserves seems unable to solve issues which are
ultimately related to the creditworthiness of counterparties.
Actually, central banks’ intervention could still be eﬀective within the
context of the model, but only by putting taxpayers’ money at risk. If, in
case of a gridlock at t =1 , the central bank stands ready to lend to all banks
short of liquidity, such banks would borrow x from the central bank instead
19The Financial Stability Forum has stressed the role of transparency: ﬁnancial institu-
tions should release reliable information on their risk exposures (including oﬀ-balance sheet
items and securitized products) to restore market conﬁdence. Regulators and supervisors
are invited to act in order to achieve that goal. See FSF (2008).
19of liquidating, provided the amount to be repaid to the central bank does
not exceed xl (the reservation price of good banks). This kind of interven-
tion would avoid an ineﬃcient liquidation of bank assets. If anticipated, it
would also avoid banks long of liquidity asking for a liquidity premium on
LT interbank loans. However, the provision of this discount window facility
would imply an expected loss for the central bank (equal to x−(1−α)xl,i f
the highest feasible rate is applied). The moral hazard implications of this
action should also be carefully considered.
This line of intervention has indeed been adopted by some central banks,
after observing the ineﬃcacy of traditional open market operations. For ex-
ample, the ECB was unable to restore normal conditions in the euro area
money market by allotting liquidity through auctions with a predetermined
limited amount, despite all the eﬀorts made to accommodate the aggregate
demand for liquidity of the banking system20. Banks were aware that the liq-
uidity injected was not properly redistributed through the interbank market,
and that borrowing from the central bank might imply paying a penalizing
rate: either by submitting aggressive bids in monetary policy auctions (see
Figure 3 below), or by using the marginal lending facility. As a consequence,
in October 2008 the ECB started to provide illimited amounts of liquidity
at ﬁxed interest rate in the main reﬁnancing operations; at the same time,
the range of eligible collateral has been enlarged and the penalization ap-
plied on the marginal lending facility has been halved (from 100 to 50 basis
points). Moreover, the interest rate applied in monetary policy operations
has been dramatically lowered (from 4.25% to 1% in several steps). The
aim of these actions has been to assure banks that they would be able to get
all the needed liquidity directly from the central bank without any penal-
ization21. The ECB has been implicitly subsidizing the banking system, by
providing unlimited liquidity at very low cost and by accepting low quality
collateral22. At last, these extreme measures have been able to eliminate the
20See ECB (2008) for details on the Eurosystem’s liquidity management in the early
stages of the ﬁnancial turmoil.
21Similar actions have been taken by the Fed: (i) the penalty on the primary discount
lending has been lowered from 100 to 50 and then to 25 b.p. above the federal funds
target rate, which in turn has been substantially lowered in several steps; (ii) reserves
have been directly supplied to all U.S. banks through the Term Auction Facility (while
only 19 primary dealers can participate in traditional open market operations); (iii) the
range of collateral has been broadened through the Term Securities Lending Facility; (iv)
primary dealers have been given access to discount window through the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility. See Cecchetti (2009) for further details.
22The credit risk incurred by the Eurosystem in providing liquidity became evident
when - in autumn 2008 - ﬁve counterparties defaulted on reﬁnancing operations for a
20abnormal liquidity premium charged on interbank loans beyond the shortest
maturities (see Figure 4 below).
Finally, an insight of the model is that, due to a "lemon problem", solvent
banks might not be able to raise liquidity in the money market in presence
of a gridlock; alternatively they have to pay a credit risk premium. These
outcomes could be avoided if the central bank were endowed with superior
information on the creditworthiness of banks, thanks to its supervisory role.
In such a case, the central bank would be able to lend money only to good
but illiquid banks, in the spirit of the Bagehot’s doctrine of the LOLR −
as advocated by Rochet - Vives (2004). Unfortunately this does not seem
to be a realistic scenario, at least by looking at the experience of the recent
ﬁnancial turmoil: apparently even the supervisory authorities did not have
an accurate information about the quality of bank assets.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The lesson we can draw from the above analysis is that the chance of a
bad news hitting the market in the future bears important consequences for
the equilibrium prevailing in the interbank market. If market participants
believe that such a bad news can lead to a gridlock, they demand a liquidity
premium for lending at maturities longer than very short ones. They fear
that an excess of reserves turns later into a shortage: if this should happen,
t h e yw o u l dc o m eb a c kt ot h em a r k e ta n dﬁnd that it is not there any more,
forcing them to liquidate some illiquid assets. The liquidity premium can get
so high that banks short of liquidity prefer to borrow short term, originating
a" ﬂight to overnight" (despite the fact that by doing so they incur in a roll-
over risk). These ﬁndings rely on the possibility that a negative shock brings
an adverse selection problem into the picture, which can be traced back to
credit risk together with hidden information about the distribution of losses
among market participants. Thus the interplay between credit and liquidity
risks plays a crucial role.
All the ingredients, necessary to obtain the above outcomes, have been
present in the global ﬁnancial turmoil of 2007-2009. (i) Some bad news
hitting the market have generated concerns that other − even worse − news
might eventually be released. (ii) The lack of information about the (cross-
total amount of euro 10.3 billions. The ECB acknowledged that the ABSs submitted as
collateral were not liquid. As a consequence, the Governing Council decided that the
NCBs should establish a total provision of 5.7 billions in their annual accounts for 2008.
See ECB (2009, b).
21b o r d e r )e x p o s u r eo fm a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n t s to troubled institutions or "toxic"
assets has created a classic "lemon problem". (iii) Banks have become more
uncertain about their liquidity needs, due to a higher volatility of liquidity
shocks, thus bearing a higher funding risk.
The policy implication of this analysis is twofold. First, more trans-
parency is needed to enable market participants to have a more accurate
picture of the distribution of losses following a negative shock. Second, the
supply of aggregate liquidity through open market operations may become
ineﬀective under a liquidity crunch; this explains why some central banks
have introduced some relevant innovations into their operational framework,
which have implied a subsidy to the banking system.
Appendix − Default risk and liquidity crunch: some styl-
ized facts
This Appendix documents some stylized facts taking place during the
2007 - 2009 ﬁnancial crisis. It is not intended to provide a formal empir-
ical test of the model presented above. Rather, it provides some evidence
supporting both some crucial assumptions of the model and its main pre-
dictions. In summary, it shows the following facts: (i) the increasing risk of
bank failure, measured by CDS premia; (ii) the more aggressive behavior of
banks participating in monetary policy operations, which is an evidence of
the increased liquidity (funding) risk; (iii) the jump of the liquidity premium
charged on interbank deals beyond the shortest maturities; (iv) the decline
of the trading activity in the interbank market; (v) the "ﬂight to overnight"
taking place right after the Lehman Brothers crash.
Figure 2 reports a plot of the premia paid on credit default swaps for
the US and EU banks (the vertical lines mark two crucial dates: August 9th
2007 (start of the crisis) and September 15th 2008 (bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers)). It is apparent that, since the beginning of the crisis, the price of
insuring against the risk of a bank default has dramatically risen. It is also
evident that the collapse of Lehman Brothers was a crucial event, making
CDS premia to reach unprecedented levels. Note that CDS premia in the
U.S. have been rising sharply during the few months preceding the LB col-
lapse: the market seems to be anticipating that some important institutions
might suﬀer severe problems. Right after the LB collapse, CDS premia has
been rising further, driven by the fear that other intermediaries might ex-
perience similar problems. During the spring of 2009, the new spike of CDS
premia presumably reﬂects a growing concern that the recession, aﬀecting
the real sector of the economy, might produce further losses to the banking
sector. This evidence is broadly consistent with the assumption, made in the
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Figure 2: Banks CDS premia (Datastream 5Y Index - daily data - b.p.)
model set-up, that participants in the money market have anticipated the
chance that a bad news might eventually hit the market, creating a lemon
problem.
Another key element of the model is the volatility of liquidity shocks,
w h i c hi sc a p t u r e db yt h ep a r a m e t e rp: the lower is this, the higher is the
chance that a current shock will be reversed in the next period. The uncer-
tainty generated by random liquidity shocks is at the origin of the liquidity
(funding) risk incurred by a bank, namely the risk of bearing large costs to
ﬁnd the liquidity needed to meet her obligations, possibly being forced to liq-
uidate illiquid assets. Since it is not possible to directly observe the volatility
of liquidity shocks for individual banks, a useful indicator of the liquidity
risk is the behavior of banks participating in monetary policy operations23:
banks facing a higher uncertainty relative to their future liquidity needs bid
more aggressively in open market operations, given that some frictions pre-
vent the interbank market from perfectly and costlessly redistributing the
aggregate available liquidity. Figure 3 reports some information for the euro
area: (i) the diﬀerence between the weighted average rate and the minimum
b i dr a t ei nt h em a i nr e ﬁnancing operations conducted by the ECB; (ii) the
"cover ratio" in the same operations, deﬁned as the ratio between total bids
23See Drehmann - Nikolaou (2009) and the literature referred to in their paper.
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Figure 3: ECB main ﬁnancing operations
and allotted amount. Both indicators document a more aggressive behavior
of European banks since August 2007; moreover, the spread between average
and minimum bid rate shows a jump after the LB collapse. This evidence
points to an increase of funding risk. This in turn is due to both a higher
volatility of liquidity shocks and higher frictions in the interbank market.
The sharp increase of frictions in the money market during the "liquidity
crunch" is well known. However, most of the available evidence is focussed
on interest rates, particularly on the evolution of the spread between rates at
diﬀerent maturities24. A picture like the one shown in Figure 4 has become
a sort of "standard view" of the liquidity crisis. The jump of the spread to
unprecedented levels has been stressed both by academic scholars and by
practitioners.
To the contrary, the evidence relative to the volume of activity is much
more scarce, due to the lack of data, which in turn is due to the OTC nature
24The spread between the 3 month interbank rate and the expected O/N rate over the
s a m ep e r i o d( p r o x i e db yt h eO / Ns w a p )i sab e n c h m a r kw i d e l yu s e d ;t h i si sr e p o r t e di n
Figure 4 for the euro area. A similar information is given by other indicators, like: the
spread between unsecured and secured interbank rates; the spread between the interbank
rate and the rate on Government bills. References to the relevant literature are given in
the Introduction.
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Figure 4: Spread 3 Month Euribor - Eonia Swap (daily data - b.p.)
of the money market. Therefore, I provide here some descriptive evidence
on the trading activity in the e-MID market: this is an electronic platform
where (unsecured) interbank loans are traded; it is located in Italy but most
of their participants are from other countries of the euro area, so it is quite
representative of the interbank market in this area25. My data set includes
tick-by-tick data for trades on all maturities − from O/N to one year −
taking place in e-MID for the period January 2007 - April 2009.
Figure 5 shows the pattern of the trading activity over the whole period.
The solid line shows the daily number of trades (on all maturities), averaged
over each month. The dashed line shows the average daily volume in each
month. Both measures of trading activity exhibit a declining pattern. The
daily number of trades, which used to be in a range between 400 and 450
in the ﬁrst half of 2007, dropped to a 250-300 range a couple of years later.
Over the same time span, the decline of traded volumes is even stronger:
from a range between 25 and 30 billions to a 5-10 billion range. Thus, the
liquidity crunch shows up not only in the number of deals, but also in their
mean value, which has considerably declined (from 70.7 millions in 2007.01
to 26.7 in 2009.04)26.
25After the introduction of the single currency, the money markets of the countries be-
longing to the euro area have rapidly become highly integrated; so they can be considered
a sas i n g l em a r k e t ,a n de - M I Di sar e l e v a n tp a r to fi t .
26ECB (2009, a) also ﬁnds a decline of the mean value of deals in e-MID between early
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Figure 5: Daily activity in the e-MID market (monthly average)
The bulk of the trading activity in e-MID is concentrated on the overnight
maturity: this accounts for more than 90% of the market (in terms both of
volume and turnover). This share is quite stable and its evolution over the
whole sample period does not show any interesting pattern. Therefore, in
order to detect the so-called "ﬂight to overnight", I provide an analysis of
a speciﬁc episode − namely the collapse of Lehman Brothers − with high
frequency data.
Figures 6 and 7 report the number of trades in each business hour, av-
eraged over the week right before/after the announcement of the LB crash
(8-12 Sept. / 15-19 Sept. 2008). While Figure 7 refers to overnight deals,
Figure 6 refers to deals with longer maturities27. It can be seen that the two
business hours where the market is more active are those between 9 a.m.
and 11 a.m.. In this crucial time band, the number of trades with matu-
rities longer than O/N dropped from about 7-8 per hour to 2 in the days
following the LB crash: thus this market segment, which already played a
2007 and mid-2008, which is attributed to a lower share of large deals (those above 100
millions euro) over total.
27To be more speciﬁc, Figure 7 refers to O/N, T/N and S/N contracts, while Figure
6 refers to all the other contracts, with maturities from one week to one year. Only the
number of trades are plotted in these two graphs. The traded volumes are highly volatile
on an hourly basis, due to the random presence of some very large deals: this is the reason
why they are not shown in these graphs.
260
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
9-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17
Before Lehman After Lehman
Figure 6: Number of trades in e-MID: maturities diﬀerent from O/N (hourly
average)
minor role, almost disappeared. To the contrary, the number of O/N deals
was (weakly) larger at all times of the day after the LB crash. By looking
at the daily number of trades we obtain the same outcome: the mean daily
number of O/N trades increases from 320 in the week before the LB crash
to 360 in the week after that event; at the same time the daily number of
trades on longer maturities declines from 26 to 16. As a consequence, the
share of O/N deals over total increases from 92% to 96%.28
These ﬁndings − although limited to a speciﬁc episode − provide some
support to the "ﬂight to overnight" eﬀect, often referred to in the literature
on the liquidity crunch. They show that, following the LB collapse, there
was a migration of the trading activity from longer maturities to the O/N
segment − despite the major role already played in e-MID by this segment
even before the start of the crisis.
To conclude, the information provided in this Appendix documents −
among other things − two stylized facts, which are consistent with the main
28These ﬁndings have been checked over a longer time span: two weeks before and after
the LB crash. The result is conﬁrmed: the daily number of O/N trades increases from
310 to 373, while the daily number of trades on longer maturities declines from 24 to 16;
thus the share of O/N deals over total increases from 93% to 96%.
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Figure 7: Number of O/N trades in e-MID (hourly average)
theoretical results of this article (stated in Proposition 4): (i) the jump of the
spread between interest rates at diﬀerent maturities, incorporating a high
liquidity premium; (ii) the polarization of trades towards short maturities.
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